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There are many social psychological theories regarding the 
nature of prejudice, but only one major theory of prejudice 
reduction: under the right circumstances, prejudice between 
groups will be reduced with increased contact.  On the one hand, 
the contact hypothesis has a range of empirical support and has 
been a major force in social change.  On the other hand, there are 
practical and ethical obstacles to any large-scale controlled test 
of the hypothesis in which relevant variables can be 
manipulated.  Here we construct a spatialized model that tests 
the core hypothesis in a large array of game-theoretic agents.  
Robust results offer a new kind of support for the contact 
hypothesis: results in simulation do accord with a hypothesis of 
reduced prejudice with increased contact.  The spatialized game-
theoretic model also suggests a deeper explanation for at least 
some of the social phenomena at issue.   
Introduction 
There are a number of social psychological theories on the 
nature of prejudice (Adorno 1950, Campbell 1965, Tajfel 
and Turner 1986), but only one major theory of prejudice 
reduction: the contact hypothesis.  According to the 
contact hypothesis, prejudice against members of one 
group by members of another will be reduced with 
increased social contact between members of the groups 
(Allport 1954).  The hypothesis is simple and accords with 
common sense; it is understandable that it underlies a 
number of social policies, its most famous association 
being the desegregation of U.S. public schools (Patchen 
1982, Schofield and Sagar 1977, Stephan 1978).  Social 
psychological support for the contact hypothesis comes 
from laboratory, field, and survey methods (Cook 1985, 
Desforges et al. 1991, Robinson 1980, Sigelman and 
Welsh 1993, Stephan and Rosenfield 1978, Wilner et al. 
1955).  As with most large-scale social psychological 
hypotheses, however, there are practical and ethical 
obstacles to conducting large-scale controlled tests in 
which relevant variables can be manipulated.  Those 
obstacles also impede the search for more fundamental 
explanation: if increased contact decreases prejudice, 
precisely how does it do so?  As Pettigrew (1998) notes, 
the contact hypothesis itself does not address process.  The 
attempts that have been made to understand mechanism, 
moreover, appeal to complex psychological processes of 
conceptual re-organization and the social dynamics of 
acquaintance and friendship (Brewer and Miller 1984, 
Gaertner et al. 1993, Pettigrew 1997). 
 We have found both a new type of confirmation for the 
contact hypothesis and hints toward deeper explanation in 
a game-theoretic simulation (Axelrod 1984, Epstein and 
Axtell 1996, Gilbert and Conte 1995, Schelling 1996).       
A Minimal Model for Social Prejudice 
Any model regarding prejudice in general must be capable 
of representing at least two different groups.  In order to 
study prejudicial behaviors, as opposed to non-prejudicial, 
there has to be some range of behaviors that in some cases 
depend upon the group-identification of agent and 
recipient.  Additionally, since prejudice has significant 
social effects, advantages and disadvantages can be 
expected to accrue depending on the behaviors that agents 
take and behaviors that are taken toward them.  If 
prejudice is represented within the parameters of the 
contact hypothesis, moreover, changes in prejudicial 
behavior have to be analyzed with reference to 
circumstances of (a) contact and (b) lack of contact 
between members of at least two different groups. 
  These conditions dictate a minimal model using: (i) 
distinct groups, (ii) behaviors which may or may not be 
differentiated by actor and recipient groups, (iii) 
consequent advantages and disadvantages of those 
behaviors, (iv) some mechanism for updating patterns of 
behavior, and (v) conditions of greater and lesser contact 
between members of the groups.  We think of the 
spatialized game-theoretic model used here as perhaps the 
simplest possible model of this form; little is built in 
beyond the minimal factors required for any model of 
prejudice adequate to the parameters of the contact 
hypothesis.  An attempt at understanding ethnocentrism, 
with some points of contact with this model, appears as 
Axelrod 1997. 
 Agents are instantiated as cells in a 2-dimensional 
cellular automata array (Gilbert and Troitzsch 1999, 
Gutowitz 1990).  Each cell interacts with only its 8 
immediate neighbors—those cells touching it on sides and  
diagonals.  Each cell is also of one of two colors—green or 
red—identifying its group. We can thus construct different 
conditions of contact by using arrays with different 
configurations of the two colors.  Integrated contact can be 
modeled by randomizing the array by color, for example.  
Segregation can be modeled by dividing the array into 
distinct color groups.  This satisfies minimal conditions (i) 
and (v) above. 
 For the interaction between agents we have each cell 
play 200 rounds in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma game 
with each of its 8 neighbors.  We use the standard matrix.  
Each player gains 3 points for joint cooperation and 1 
point for joint defection.  Should one player defect and the 
other cooperate, the defector gets 5 points and the 
cooperator gets 0 (Table 1).  The advantages and 
disadvantages of interaction in condition (iii) are reflected 
in each cell’s total score.  Here again we have constructed 
our model as simply as possible, using the standard e. coli 
game-theoretic model for conflict and cooperation, 
familiar from over 20 years of simulation research [3, 4].    
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Table 1.  Standard Prisoner’s Dilemma matrix, left gains 
to  Player B. 
  
 We take as a basis just the 8 reactive strategies in an 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: strategies with behaviors on 
a given round determined only by behavior of the 
opponent on the previous round.  These are shown in 
Table 2 using 0 for defect, 1 for cooperate, and a coding 
<i,c,d> to indicate a strategy’s initial move i, its response 
c to cooperation by the opponent on the previous round , 
and its response d to defection by the opponent on the 
previous round.   
 
   <0,0,0>  All-Defect 
   <0,0,1>  Suspicious Perverse 
   <0,1,0>  Suspicious Tit for Tat 
   <0,1,1>  D-then-All-Cooperate 
   <1,0,0>  C-then-All-Defect 
   <1,0,1>  Perverse 
   <1,1,0>  Tit for Tat 
   <1,1,1>  All-Cooperate 
 
Table 2.  The 8 reactive strategies in an iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma. 
 
 Suppose we start with a randomized cellular automata 
array of these 8 strategies.  After 200 rounds of play with 
each of its neighbors, our cells total their scores.  If a cell 
has a neighbor with a higher score, it adopts the strategy 
of its highest-scoring neighbor.  In the case of a tie 
between higher-scoring neighbors, the strategy of one is 
chosen at random.  This gives us a simple mechanism, 
well explored in the literature (Kennedy et al. 2001, 
Nowak and May 1993a, Nowak and May 1993b), as our 
updating schema for condition (iv).  If we start with a 
randomized array of these 8 strategies, it is well known 
that dominance goes first to All-Defect and C-then-All-
Defect, but that Tit for Tat (TFT) then grows in clusters 
and eventually conquers the entire array: a vindication for 
the robustness of TFT in a spatialized environment (Grim 
1995, Grim 1996, Luna and Stefansson 2000). 
 Each of these 8 simple strategies is ‘color-blind’: each 
reacts to its opponent’s previous play, but without regard 
to color.  In order to meet condition (ii) in modeling 
prejudicial behavior, we add a single strategy PTFT 
(‘Prejudicial Tit for Tat’).  PTFT plays TFT with an 
opponent of its own color, but plays All-Defect against any 
opponent of the other color (Grim et al. 1998, Poundstone 
1992).   
 In summary, we work with a 64 x 64 toroidal or ‘wrap-
around’ array of 4096 cells, each of which has a 
background color of red or green.  Different arrangements 
of those colors allow for different test conditions regarding 
the contact hypothesis.  Each cell plays 200 rounds of an 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma strategy with its 8 neighbors, 
following one of 8 ‘color-blind’ strategies or a ‘color-
sensitive’ strategy PTFT.  After 200 rounds the gains and 
losses are totaled for each cell.  If a cell has a higher-
scoring neighbor, it adopts that strategy that has been most 
successful in its immediate neighborhood.  Strategies are 
changed, but never colors, and strategy-updating is 
synchronous across the array.  With a new configuration 
of strategies, we begin a new round of local play.  
 This is our minimal model for the conditions of the 
contact hypothesis.  There are no complications of genetic 
algorithms or learning in neural nets, our agents do not 
construct any internal representations and indeed have no 
psychological depth at all.  In Allport’s original 
presentation, the contact hypothesis is qualified by a set of 
conditions that have been further elaborated and debated 
in the literature since: in order to reduce prejudice the 
contact at issue must be carried out by participants of 
equal status, who share common goals, participate in 
inter-group cooperation, and receive the support of 
authorities (1954).  These complications are also largely 
missing in our model.  While equal status for our cells is 
assured, cells operate in terms of purely individual gains 
and losses rather than common goals.  Although there may 
be cooperation between individuals, there is nothing to 
model ‘intergroup cooperation.’  Since none of our cells 
represent authoritative figures, our model does not 
instantiate any kind of authoritative support. 
Simulational Confirmation for the Contact 
Hypothesis 
Despite the simplicity of the model, and despite the 
absence of the additional Allport conditions, our 
simulation robustly and persistently generates the 









suggests that the basic principles of contact networks and 
advantage, modeled in spatialialized game theory, may be 
sufficient to explain at least some aspects of the dynamics 
of real prejudice that have been noted in the social 
psychological literature.   
 First, consider an array that is carefully segregated in 
terms of background color.  The array, divided in half 
down the middle, consists of green individuals on the one 
side and red individuals on the other (Figure 1).   
 
 
Figure 1.  A segregated array of red and green 
 
Over this array we layer a randomized distribution of 
strategies.  A red cell might thus instantiate any of our 8 
‘color-blind’ reactive strategies <0,0,0>, <0,0,1>, ..., 
<1,1,1>, or  might instead instantiate the color-sensitive 
strategy PTFT, representable as <1,1,0>/<0,0,0>.  From 
that initial randomized array of strategies we follow the 
updating algorithm outlined: after playing 200 rounds of 
the iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma with each of its 
immediate neighbors, each cell surveys the success of its 
neighbors.  If any has proven more successful, the cell 
copies the strategy of its most successful neighbor. 
 With a segregated background, the array converges 
within approximately 12 generations to a mixture of TFT 
and PTFT.  The ‘prejudicial’ strategy, in other words, 
proves successful in occupying roughly 50% of the final 
array.  In different runs, starting from different initial 
randomizations, either TFT or PTFT may show a slight 
dominance.  The development of a typical array is shown 
in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 2.  Percentages of the population for 9 strategies in 
an array segregated by color.  20 generations shown. 
    
    
           
 
Figure 3.  Evolution of randomized strategies to shared 
dominance by TFT and PTFT in an array segregated by 
color.  Generations 0, 2, 4, 6, and 10 shown. 
 
 The claim of the contact hypothesis is that increased 
contact between groups will reduce prejudice.  We 
therefore introduce a second array, with randomized 




Figure 4.  An integrated array of red and green 
 
We overlay this integrated array with an initial 
randomization of our 9 strategies, as before, and repeat the 
simulation.  Within 20 generations, the array shows a 
nearly complete conquest by TFT.  Except for lone 
individuals or very small clusters, PTFT has been 
eliminated (Figures 5 and 6). 
 
Figure 5.  Percentages of the population for 9 strategies in 
an array randomized by color. 20 generations shown. 
 
    
    
   
 
Figure 6.  Evolution of randomized strategies to 
dominance by TFT in an integrated (randomized) color 
array.  Generations 0, 4, 8, 12, 16, and 20 shown. 
Social Identity Theory and a Stronger Result 
 
We take this result to be a strong simulational 
instantiation of the basic phenomena predicted by the 
contact hypothesis.  The result can be further strengthened 
by introducing a modeling factor borrowed from another 
theory of the nature of prejudice.   
 Social identity theory posits that much of one’s identity 
is informed by the groups to which one belongs, and by the 
positive or negative perceptions of those groups.  People 
are strongly motivated to develop a positive social identity; 
positive attitudes towards their own group and prejudice 
against others is one effect (Tajfel and Turner 1986).    In 
our model PTFT is the only strategy that makes a 
distinction as to color.  In order to model an additional 
value for ‘social identification’ we might then add a single 
point to PTFT cells when they are playing with neighbors 
that share the same color.   A green PTFT playing a green 
All-C, for example, will be awarded 601 points instead of 
600 points for 200 rounds of the iterated prisoner’s 
dilemma.   
  
 
Figure 7.  Percentages of the population for 9 strategies in 
a segregated array, with one extra ‘social identification’ 
point for PTFT playing a cell of its own color. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Percentages of the population for 9 strategies in 
an array randomized by color, with one extra ‘social 
identification’ point for PTFT playing a cell of its own 
color.   
With this extra ‘social identification’ point for PTFT, the 
segregated array shown in Figure 2 now goes entirely to 
the prejudicial strategy PTFT (Figure 7).  The array in 
which green and red strategies are mixed at random, on 
the other hand, still goes almost entirely to ‘color-blind’ 
TFT (Figure 8). 
 
Eliminating established prejudice 
 
Our models begin with a randomized array of strategies.  
In an environment mixed as to background color, the 
model shows evolution to dominance by TFT.  In an 
environment segregated with regard to background color, 
the model shows evolution to co-dominance between TFT 
and PTFT in the simpler case, and evolution to full 
dominance by PTFT with a single additional ‘social 
identification’ point.   
 The contact hypothesis, however, is a hypothesis about 
prejudice reduction.  What our models most directly show, 
it might be objected, is not reduction of established 
prejudice but the effect of contact in discouraging the 
spread of prejudice.   
  Many criticisms of model-building simply call for 
better models.  In this case we can address the objection 
directly by starting not with a randomized array of 
strategies but with scattered territories of TFT and PTFT 
such as those shown in the final frame of Figure 2.   What 
if we begin with this distribution of just these strategies, 
but with a mixed color background?  Will established 
prejudice be eliminated? 
 The answer is ‘yes’.  Figure 9 shows evolution from 
such a distribution to clear dominance by TFT in a mixed 
environment.  A similar shift to dominance by TFT can be 
shown if we start with an array dominated by PTFT except 
for very small patches of TFT, and give an additional 
‘social identification’ point to PTFT when it plays its own 




Figure 9.  The Elimination of Established Prejudice: 
Triumph by TFT from scattered territories of PTFT and 
TFT in an array randomized by color.   
 
Conclusion 
Our attempt has been to construct a minimal model of 
prejudice adequate to the basic parameters of the contact 
hypothesis.  The computationally interesting fact is that 
phenomena of precisely the sort the contact hypothesis 
would predict are evident in even this minimal model.  In 
this respect, our results offer a model-confirmation of the 
contact hypothesis.   
    What our results further suggest is that patterns of 
individual advantage in different contact networks——
captured by game-theoretical payoffs in a spatialized 
cellular automata—may be sufficient to explain why the 
contact hypothesis holds.  Previous attempts to explain 
reduction of prejudice have appealed to complex 
psychological mechanisms of conceptual re-organization 
and the social dynamics of acquaintance and friendship 
(Brewer and Miller 1984; Gaertner et al.; Pettigrew 1997).  
Spatialized game-theoretic considerations of advantage 
and imitation seem to offer a simpler and deeper 
explanation for at least some of the phenomena at issue.   
    As aids to intuition and theoretical development, 
models such as this one may prove useful regarding other 
sociological and social psychological hypotheses that are 
difficult to test under strictly controlled conditions: 
hypotheses regarding deterrence and the death penalty, 
harm and pornography, or trickle-down economics. 
    It must be admitted that the methodological use of 
artificial societies is still at an early stage of development.  
Like both animal experimentation on the one hand and 
economic modeling on the other, simulational sociology 
has major limitations.  Questions regarding the realism of 
a model and thus its generalizability to real societies 
inevitably remain.  In this case, the matter is complicated 
by the fact that our model is so simple as to abstract away 
from many of the Allport provisos: the condition requiring 
equal status is satisfied, for example, but qualifications 
regarding common goals and intergroup cooperation play 
no role.  Our results thus provide grounds for questioning 
whether these are in fact necessary for the basic 
phenomena of the contact hypothesis.  Further research 
may be able to establish whether these conditions might 
play a more complicated role.  Intergroup cooperation may 
not be strictly required for contact to reduce prejudice, for 
example, although certain types of intergroup conflict may 
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